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Abstract
Foundational puzzles surround (Newtonian) gravitational thermal physics—a realm
in which stars are treated as akin to molecules in a gas. Whether such an enterprise
is successful and the domain of thermal physics extends beyond our terrestrial sphere
is disputed. There are successes (such as the collisionless Boltzmann equation) and
paradoxical features (such as the ‘gravothermal catastrophe’). Callender (Found Phys
41(6):960–981, 2011) advocates reconciling the two sides of the dispute by taking a
broader view of thermodynamics. Here I argue for an alternative position: if we are
careful in distinguishing statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, then no reconcil-
iation is required. Both sides can live in harmony because whilst statistical mechanics
applies, thermodynamics does not. This state of affairs—the applicability of statistical
mechanics without the emergence of thermodynamic behaviour—can be explained in
terms of an infamous infinite idealisation: the thermodynamic limit.
Keywords Statistical mechanics · Thermodynamics · The thermodynamic limit ·
Self-gravitating systems · Reduction
1 Introduction
The foundations of thermal physics are riddled with controversy. The keystone of
the philosophical debate is the old issue of whether thermodynamics (TD) reduces in
some appropriate way to statistical mechanics (SM). This issue involves analysing the
thermodynamic limit (i.e. roughly the limit of an infinite number of microconstituents);
and so leads immediately to the topic of infinite idealisations. Namely: how should we
understand this limit given that any physical system to which we successfully apply
thermodynamics and/or statistical mechanics contains in fact a finite number of atoms
(or other microconstituents)? The debate in thermal physics has centred around phase
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transitions. The SM description of phase transitions requires the thermodynamic limit,
unlike the TD description, which seemingly makes the TD description superior and
so—some argue—non-reducible to SM. In this paper, I consider a different case in
thermal physics where, I will argue, statistical mechanics has the upper hand. This case
further differs from the usual phase transitions case: I will argue that the philosophical
interest of this field of physics, and the light it sheds on the thermodynamics/statistical
mechanics relation, turns on the fact that here, the thermodynamic limit does not exist.
This field is often called ‘gravitational thermal physics’—and so the tangles of
thermal physics reach beyond our terrestrial sphere. But even if we set aside black
holes, the claim that thermal physics successfully applies to Newtonian astrophysical
contexts has been disputed. Such an enterprise involves applying the ideas of ther-
mal physics to vast collections of stars: both globular clusters with ca. 105 stars and
galaxies with ca. 1011 stars. The key idea is to think of such a collection as like a gas:
just as the molecules in a gas are its microconstituents, the stars in such a collection
are its “microconstituents”. This is obviously a very striking, indeed bold, idea: both
physically and philosophically. Physically, because we expect disanalogies between
the idealisations made for a collection of molecules and those made for a collection
of stars. In particular, stars interact by gravity, which is systematically set aside in ter-
restrial applications of thermal physics. Philosophically, because our epistemic access
to (our warrant for believing in) molecules and stars are so very different. Stars are
epitomes of the observable; since the ancients turned their eyes heavenwards, we have
believed in them—though of course what we have believed about them has altered
immensely since ancient times, especially since 1850 with the application of spec-
troscopy to starlight through to today’s stunning observational knowledge of stars’
lifecycles. This philosophical disanalogy between molecules and stars will play out in
what follows, especially in connection with (1) the relationship of thermodynamics to
statistical mechanics and (2) Einstein’s distinction between constitutive and principle
theories. And as we will see, the question of the existence and the nature of the ther-
modynamic limit—the infinite idealisation of infinitely many stars—will be central.
Whilst such philosophical and physical disanalogies abound, ultimately the ques-
tion is whether (Newtonian) gravitational thermal physics is a successful enterprise.
Thus Callender asks whether “the stars in such systems or even the galaxies themselves,
when idealised as point particles, admit a thermodynamic description” (Callender
2010, p. 44). Does thermal physics apply to these Newtonian self-gravitating sys-
tems? Is this an extension of the domain of applicability? Indeed, does this case give
further weight to the idea that thermodynamics is universal?
On the one hand, it seems that thermal physics applies to self-gravitating sys-
tems (SGS). For instance, in certain circumstances the evolution of the distribution of
stars in a galaxy can be modeled using the collisionless Boltzmann equation or the
Fokker-Planck equation (see e.g. Binney and Tremaine 1987). On the other hand, self-
gravitating systems exhibit many unusual features, sometimes called the ‘gravitational
paradoxes’, as discussed in Sect. 2.
There is a prima facie dispute in the scientific community. Some express Optimism
over the applicability of thermal physics: “Statistical mechanics of gravitating systems
is a controversial subject. However, our modern understanding of statistical mechanics
and thermodynamics does handle gravitational interactions rigorously with complete
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satisfaction” (Kiessling 1999, p. 545). Other express Pessimism: “[Thermodynamics]
is essentially a human science; it started with steam engines and went on to describe
many physical and chemical systems whose size is of the order of a metre. They clearly
are inapplicable to the solar system or to galaxies. Clearly classical thermodynamics
is not a useful branch of science in cosmology; we have extrapolated too far from its
human-sized origins” (Rowlinson 1993, p. 873).
Of course, one might be tempted to ‘hedge your bets’ and claim that whilst gravita-
tional thermal physics has some successes, this success is qualified by the paradoxes.
That is, one might claim, as is often the case with optimism and pessimism, that there
are shades of grey: the truth lies in between.
But I think we can do better than merely hedging our bets in this dispute. My goal
in this paper is to make peace between the Optimists and the Pessimists, by deflating
the debate between them. I argue that: if we are careful in distinguishing statistical
mechanics and thermodynamics, then no reconciliation is required. Both sides can live
in harmony because whilst statistical mechanics applies, thermodynamics does not.
This position differs from Callender (2011), who brought this dispute to the attention
of the philosophy of physics community (Callender 2010). He notes the successful
features emphasised by the Optimists, whilst not minimising the difficult features that
a Pessimist might stress. But—motivated by his broader position in the foundations
of thermal physics, namely: we should not take thermodynamics too seriously and so
advocates a more flexible, and so more liberal, view of thermodynamics—Callender
subscribes to a (cautious) Optimism. That is, he holds that the problems facing SGS
do not “spell the end for gravitational equilibrium thermodynamics” (Callender 2011,
p. 962).
A disclaimer at the outset: my reply to Callender will not hinge on bringing new
physics to bear on the dispute, but rather a different perspective on the foundations of
thermal physics. Thus the main message will be: the example of self-gravitating sys-
tems need not necessitate having a broader or more flexible view of thermodynamics.
In Sect. 2, I recapitulate Callender’s discussion of the thermal physics of self-
gravitating systems: the difference from ordinary systems, the successes and the
unusual ‘gravitational paradoxes’. Section 3 outlines my strategy of delineating SM
and TD, and connects such a strategy to the reduction debate, and to Callender’s
position. In Sect. 4, I argue that thermodynamics does not apply to self-gravitating
systems. Section 5 outlines the extent to which statistical mechanics applies. Thus,
my verdict on the dispute is that there is (to an extent) a statistical mechanical descrip-
tion of SGS, even though no thermodynamic behaviour emerges. Section 6 sketches
an explanation of why thermodynamics and statistical mechanics come apart in this
case. This explanation will hinge on the thermodynamic limit, and so I also outline
the connections to the wider debate about the role of the thermodynamic limit in the
relationship between SM and TD. Section 7 concludes.
2 Newtonian gravity weighs in
In this section, I first review how incorporating gravity changes the physics of thermal
systems and discuss the type of systems well-approximated by this treatment. I then
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Fig. 1 Diagram from Callender
(2010) (adapted from Binney
and Tremaine). In a collisionless
system with constant density of
stars, the force exerted on a star
at the apex is the same from the
band of stars r1 as from the band
of stars at r2
outline two examples of successful evolution equations. Finally, I discuss some of the
‘paradoxical’ features.
2.1 How the situation changes with gravity
Gravitational forces are negligible in the terrestrial thermal systems with which we
are familiar. But in extraterrestrial systems such as galaxies, this assumption is of
course no longer justified. Unlike the local collisions and forces in an ideal gas, the
gravitational force is long-range; the range of the dominant interaction is large relative
to the spatial size of the system. Consequently, the forces on a given star are not only
due to its nearest neighbours, but include a contribution from the large scale structure
of the stellar system. Indeed, if the density of stars is spatially constant (cf. Fig. 1),
the gravitational force exerted on a given star (by the rest of the stellar system) at the
apex is the same from the patch of stars of solid angle d surrounding it at distance
r1, as from the patch at distance r2. Clearly if the distribution of stars were exactly
spherical, there would be no net force on this star. However, if the density of stars falls
off more slowly in one direction, then only this very global feature of the entire stellar
system will be responsible for the force on our star. This contrasts sharply with the
forces experienced by a molecule in gas, which come only from its nearest neighbours
and thus is a much more local feature.
The gravitational potential V ∼ 1
r
is asymptotically zero; and this dominates the
behaviour of SGS due to (i) its infinite range and (ii) the fact that a (potentially infinite)
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Fig. 2 The gravitational
potential energy. Here r
corresponds to |qi − q j | in Eq. 1
amount of energy can be released as two point particles get arbitrarily close together,
as seen in Fig. 2.
Here, we primarily focus on the gravitational n-body case where stellar systems are
treated as collections of n point masses. Unlike ideal gases, the total energy is not even
approximately the sum of the kinetic energy of the constituents since the (negative)
gravitational potential energy must be included. The Hamiltonian for such a system
of n ‘particles’ of equal mass m is thus:
H(q, p) =
n∑
i=1
pi2
2m
− 1
2
n∑
i=1
∑
i = j
Gm2
|qi − qj| (1)
Whilst this is an idealisation, it provides a very successful description of elliptical
galaxies (1011 stars) and globular clusters, i.e. spherical gravitationally bound systems
of about 105 stars, which both contain very little interstellar medium (dust and gas).
Of course, for some systems we cannot ignore hydrodynamics—namely when inter-
stellar dust and gas are relevant. And for some systems general relativity cannot be
ignored. For example, this applies when black holes are present, and when the cosmo-
logical structure i.e. curvature of space on very long length scales, cannot be ignored,
such as in the dynamics of clusters of galaxies.
Indeed, I should make an obvious and more general disclaimer: whilst Newtonian
thermal physics can be used in galactic dynamics describing extraterrestrial systems it
is (unsurprisingly) far from the whole story. Nevertheless, models based on the simple
Hamiltonian (1) have had some venerable successes: cf. Sect. 2.2.
2.2 Successes
I shall sketch two approaches, the first assuming stars do not ‘collide’, the second
allowing for collisions. To model these gravitating systems, the broad idea is to find a
probability density function f in phase space and consider its evolution.
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Modelling a stellar system to be collisionless requires the approximation that no
‘encounters’ occur. An encounter occurs when two stars are so close as to cause a
gravitational perturbation, altering their orbits. (Collisions involving physical contact
between stars are exceedingly rare and can be ignored in most models.)
The star’s orbit is then approximated by assuming the total mass of the system is
smoothly distributed instead of concentrated in point-like stars. This ‘collisionless’
(encounter-less) approximation holds for certain systems, in particular: for globular
clusters and elliptical galaxies (containing about 1010 stars) since, for timescales less
than the relaxation time, stellar encounters are unimportant except at their centres
(Binney and Tremaine 1987).
Here, the relaxation time is proportional to the number of stars and the time taken
for a star to cross the galaxy (the crossing time). After the relaxation time the star’s
actual velocity differs from the smooth gravitational field case and its orbit will deviate
from the smooth field model by an amount of the order of its original velocity.
As in Boltzmann’s treatment of a dilute gas, we define a probability density function
f (−→r ,−→v , t) where f (−→r ,−→v , t)d3rd3v gives the probability at t of finding a star in
volume d3r around r with velocity within d3v of v. Since we assume all N stars
have the same probability density function (and are stochastically independent of
each other), this function is defined in a 6-dimensional phase space, rather than the
6N -dimensional phase space of the entire set of N stars.
The collisionless Boltzmann equation gives this function’s evolution;
∂ f
∂t
+ [ f , H ] = 0 (2)
where H is given by Eq. 1. Note that the collisionless Boltzmann equation is nonlinear
as the gravitational potential (x, t) depends on the distribution of stars’ masses,
f (−→r ,−→v , t).
We can define the entropy
S = −N
∫
f (r, v, t) ln f (r, v, t)d3rd3v. (3)
To look at the evolution of a stellar system over timescales longer than the relaxation
time, in which encounters between stars must be considered, we need what is (usually)
called the Fokker-Planck approximation. The encounter operator, [ f ], gives the
difference of the probability that a star is scattered into and out of a volume of phase
space in a given time interval. Equation 2 becomes
∂ f
∂t
+ [ f , H ] = [ f ]. (4)
To sum up: the collisionless Boltzmann and Fokker-Planck equations have proven
to be empirically successful evolution equations for the systems described at the end
of Sect. 2.1.1
1 For some examples of solutions to the collisionless Boltzmann equation, the initial conditions and approx-
imations involved, see (Heggie and Hut 2003, ch. 8). Much of the research in this area focuses computational
123
Synthese
Fig. 3 Components interacting via short-range forces, as is the case for an ideal gas at room temperature
2.3 Unusual features
However, the extension of thermal physics to SGS is far from seamless. There are a
wide array of problems surveyed in Callender (2011): of which I will consider only
three.
(1) Strong interactions Firstly, functions, such as energy and entropy, are often not
additive or extensive for SGS. For an ideal gas the total energy E is the kinetic energy
K , whereas for gravitating systems the (negative) potential energy U contributes:
E = K + U . Functions such as energy and entropy are usually additive: the energy
of a combined system A + B is just the sum of the energy of A and the energy of
B. Usually the Hamiltonian of the joint system is HAB = HA + HB + Hint , but
it can be approximated by HAB = HA + HB . (So strictly speaking, the energy is
additive iff there are no interactions, i.e. Hint = 0). However, a SGS will not have
even approximately additive functions since the neighbouring stars do not contribute
the majority of the influence on a particular star (Cf. Fig. 1). That is, the interaction
Hamiltonian, Hint ≈ 0. The physical reason for this can be seen in Figs. 3 and 4,
showing how putting together two ‘boxes’ of gravitating stars alters both boxes: the
long-range attractive forces result in ‘clustering’ or ‘clumping’ not seen for ideal gases
(or indeed real gases in terrestrial settings, which are well described by zero or only
short-range forces between constituents). For these gases, short-range potentials are
dominant—adding two boxes of gases does not alter the systems in such a dramatic
way, since the systems only interact at their boundary.
Footnote 1 continued
simulations (cf. Sect. 4.2). One useful class of models that take the velocity distribution to be isotropic is
Plummer’s model, named after Plummer who used this approximation to fit the observed light distributions
of clusters (Spitzer 1987, p. 13).
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Fig. 4 Components interacting via long-range forces, as is the case for self-gravitating systems
As a consequence, variables such as energy and entropy are usually taken to be
extensive. Here, a variable is called ‘extensive’ if it depends linearly on the size of, i.e.
the number of constituents in, the system (e.g. mass, internal energy, volume)2 and is
called ‘intensive’ if independent of system size (e.g. density, pressure). The energy of a
subsystem is proportional to the volume, whereas interactions between subsystems are
proportional to their interface boundary’s surface area and are, therefore, of a smaller
order of magnitude, provided the subsystems are big enough. So strictly speaking, even
for short-range potentials, entropy and energy are only extensive in the thermodynamic
limit. But although this is a matter of degree, there is still a contrast of principle with
SGS. For energy and entropy are not extensive for gravitating systems, no matter how
large the system.3
(2) Putting in energy reduces the temperature Gravitating systems can have a very
unusual property: negative heat capacity. The heat capacity (at constant volume) is the
amount of energy required to raise the temperature by one degree at constant volume;
CV = ∂ E
∂T
∣∣∣∣
V
. (5)
When the system is in virial equilibrium (where 2K + U = 0), the total energy
is negative (E = K + U , so E = −K , where K is by definition positive). From
the equipartition theorem , we have K = 32 NkB T . This implies E = − 32 NkB T and
2 More generally, an extensive variable Q is homogeneous (in the modes nc) iff Q(kn1, kn2, ..) =
k Q(n1, n2, ...).
3 Callender (2011, p. 974) takes the failure of extensivity to be a key problem, but suggests that perhaps
extensivity can be recovered through the Kac prescription (a rescaling of the temporal and spatial parameters
such that the constant c := −Gm2 in the Hamiltonian (1) becomes c = ± 1N ). Since the merits of this
prescription is an open issue in physics, I do not explore it further here.
123
Synthese
thus CV = − 32 NkB : the heat capacity is negative. If the system gives out energy, the
temperature will increase. If you put energy into a system, the temperature goes down.
Indeed, unusual!
(3) The gravothermal catastrophe Thirdly, there is the infamous gravothermal catas-
trophe (Lynden-Bell et al. 1968). To explain this, let us consider in general terms
which evolutions are entropically favourable. Whether a process (such as expansion)
increases entropy depends on whether the phase space volume increases. Thus, for
example, expansion of an ideal gas is entropically favoured since it increases the vol-
ume available. Ceteris paribus, the hotter the system the higher its entropy as more
momentum states are available (due to the increased kinetic energy). So whether an
expansion of a self-gravitating system increases or decreases entropy depends on how
the competing factors affect the phase space volume (Wallace 2010). An increased
volume means more spatial states but results in a decreased number of momentum
states as the kinetic energy has decreased, since work is done against the attractive
gravitational field.
Turning now to SGS: when the density contrast between the edge and centre of a
SGS is great enough, we conceptually divide the system into a uniform core and a
uniform halo, each in virial equilibrium. If a small amount of heat is transferred to
the envelope from the core, the core’s kinetic energy decreases, making it favourable
for the core to contract (as U = 2E , E has decreased so U is more negative). Since
the core has negative heat capacity, losing energy increases the temperature. The core
decreases in entropy but this is more than offset by the expansion and cooling of the
halo.4 The heat flow and contraction increases the temperature gradient between the
core and envelope and thus the process of heat transfer from the core to the halo is
self-perpetuating.
The gravitational potential, V ∼ 1
r
, being unbounded from below as r → 0, means
that this collapse would appear to continue without end. For an infinite amount of
potential energy can be released by moving two particles closer and closer together,
as seen in Fig. 2. Consequently, it seems that there are no equilibrium states. No
equilibrium will be reached since, according to the gravitational potential, the core
can keep contracting indefinitely becoming infinitely dense.
Is this gravothermal collapse observed? Here we meet a familiar philosophical
theme: that singularities in one theory can signify the breakdown of that theory, and
often signal some features of the successor theory (Berry 2002; Batterman 2001)—so
that idealisations taking some quantity to infinity can play a key role in inter-theory
relations. More generally, physics consists of models which have a limited domain
of applicability; if you push any model of physics far enough it will break down. As
Feynman quips: “When you follow any of our physics too far, you find it always gets
into some kind of trouble” (Feynman et al. 1964, §28.1). The same point is made
in the literature about SGS: Hut says “whenever a theory predicts the occurrence of
singularities, it has been a sign that other physical effects, which have been overlooked,
will kick in before actual infinities are reached” (Hut 1997).
4 Conservation of energy requires that the heat flow from the core to the halo increases the halo’s energy—
which is now less negative. Thus, it is favourable for the halo to expand and cool.
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But to return the question of gravothermal collapse: indeed, as Hut says, other
physical effects eventually kick in. Globular clusters undergo this gravothermal col-
lapse, albeit over a period of tens of millions of years. Agreed: in a globular cluster,
the formation of hard binaries provides the core with an energy source (Spitzer and
Ostriker 1997, p. 363): nevertheless, once exhausted gravitational collapse will con-
tinue. Another instance is a contracting gas cloud (that ultimately will form stars)
where the heat is emitted as electromagnetic radiation (due to the presence of an inter-
stellar medium which is absent from globular clusters). In the case of stars, fusion
processes provide the energy source to resist gravitational collapse but eventually this
energy source runs out. In this case, gravitational collapse resumes until another effect
(dependent on the star’s mass) kicks in. For example: for stars of around 10 solar
masses, collapse continues until a supernova occurs leaving a neutron star in which
the degeneracy pressure (a consequence of the Pauli exclusion principle) resists the
attractive force of gravity (Phillips 2013).
But I will not need more details about these “additional physical effects”. For this
paper, the main point of all these other effects is that they involve various theories and
subdisciplines of physics such as hydrodynamics, quantum theory—and statistical
mechanics (cf. Sects. 4 and 5).5
3 My strategy for reconciliation
Callender (2011) argues that to reconcile the two sides of the debate, we should take a
broader, more liberal view of thermodynamics. We should not ‘take thermodynamics
too seriously’ but allow for such unusual features. For example, equilibrium needn’t
be strict (Callender 2001).
Thus Callender asks: what should we conclude from SGS’s unusual features? He
says “If there is a general lesson, I believe it is that we sometimes have too narrow
a vision of thermodynamics. In his beautiful review, Thompson (1972) writes that ‘to
show that thermodynamics exists for a given system’ we must (a) ‘prove. . . the exis-
tence of the thermodynamic limit’ and (b) ‘show that the resulting thermodynamics
is stable’, i.e., prove that specific heat is positive. By these criteria, self-gravitating
systems badly fail as thermodynamic systems. Yet thermodynamic techniques some-
times have proven successful when applied to self-gravitating systems. How do we
reconcile these two facts?” (Callender 2011, p. 979).
I advocate a different view: by dividing thermal physics into thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics, no reconciliation is required. This is because phenomenologi-
5 Callender attempts to abstract away from these details above by altering the gravitational potential by
introducing a short cut-off potential η which prevents the gravitational potential → −∞ as |qi − q j | → 0
as the potential is now bounded from below.
1
|qi − qj| → 1√
(qi−qj)2+η2
(6)
Perhaps this short distance cut-off is artificial, but regardless of whether we impose it, there are still no
equilibrium states in the sense of a state with maximum entropy.
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cal thermodynamics does not apply to these systems (a claim I argue for in Sect. 4),
although, to a certain extent, statistical mechanics does (a claim I argue for in Sect. 5).
Thus, the dispute over the applicability of thermal physics is deflated as merely seman-
tic: the Optimists are talking about SM whereas the Pessimists are talking about TD.
Of course, dividing thermal physics into TD and SM is an incredibly contentious
matter. Can one draw a clean line and if so, where should one draw it? I submit that
some division, albeit a rough or vague one, must be possible, as a prerequisite of the
meaningfulness of the reduction debate, which after all requires that there are two
theories, one of which may or may not ‘reduce’ to the other. (And whatever one’s
qualms about the reduction debate, to say it is meaningless is surely just intellectual
defeatism).
That such a line can be drawn is a prerequisite of the reduction debate and how
it is drawn is important for whether a reduction exists: for claims of reduction are
evaluated not only in relation to a given account of reduction, but also in relation to
the definitions of the two theories.
I agree that there are multiple possibilities of how to draw the line between TD and
SM—and these different options have various foundational motivations. There is a
plurality of ways to carve up the terrain, and how one does it depends on one’s aims.
Thus if you believe that SM is the powerhouse of thermal physics (Wallace 2015), your
preferred line might be different from those who venerate thermodynamics (such as
Eddington 1928, p. 104). In addition to this question of the conceptual priority of TD or
SM, the foundational debate between Gibbsians and Boltzmannians plays a role. For
instance, one might advocate a Gibbsian definition of equilibrium (that the probability
distribution is stationary) because it nicely lines up with the thermodynamic defini-
tion (that the macrovariables are stationary). This is because the phase average of a
macrovariable6, using a stationary probability distribution will also be stationary—so
with reduction in mind, this Gibbsian definition is a good SM candidate for reducing
TD equilibrium. On the other hand, Callender advocates a Boltzmannian view of SM:
according to which equilibrium is defined to be the largest macrostate and the system
can fluctuate away from equilibrium, which is arguably unlike the traditional thermo-
dynamic definition. In order that reduction is still on the cards, Callender advocates
taking a more liberal view of thermodynamics (Callender 2001). Thus, Callender’s
reconciliation between the Optimists and the Pessimists is part of his wider view of
the foundation of thermal physics. Hence, the line I propose between TD and SM in
what follows may have different foundational motivations than that of Callender and
others.
Thus, whilst some split must be possible, that is not to say it is either precise or
wholly objective. Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics developed ‘cheek by
jowl’ and so a sharing, indeed a blurring of concepts, methods and results seems
inevitable. As part of the historical progress of science, the original meaning of theo-
retical terms in one theory bends under the success of another. As is well-documented,
the success of SM led to conceptual extensions of TD, such as negative temperatures.
Indeed, one might see this as evidence of a successful diachronic reduction, with SM
6 Of course, why Gibbs phase averaging works is a source of controversy, cf., e.g. Malament and Zabell
(1980).
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the successor theory. Furthermore, this explains how such a semantic dispute could
arise between the Optimists and the Pessimists; often physicists talk of ‘statistical
thermodynamics’ and arguably it is the (putative) reduction that has led to the blurring
of the two theories for practical purposes.
But the putative reduction of TD to SM is not only a diachronic reduction of an older
theory to its successor, but also a synchronic reduction of the higher-level macroscopic
theory to the lower-level underlying microscopic theory. The inter-theoretic relation-
ship between TD-SM differs from the classic diachronic reduction between Newtonian
mechanics and Special Relativity. Newtonian mechanics is wrong in certain domains
and predictions, but it is contested whether thermodynamics is wrong in the same
way. This is made especially clear by those who venerate thermodynamics, claiming
it to be fundamental. Planck, for example, took the second law of TD to be universal,
applicable to “every process occurring in nature” (Planck 1926, p. 463) (as quoted in
Uffink 2006, p. 280). One classic exponent of this view is Eddington, who claimed
that: “If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagree-
ment with Maxwell’s equations—then so much the worse for Maxwell’s equations. If
it is found to be contradicted by observation—well, these experimentalists do bungle
things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be against the second law of ther-
modynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest
humiliation” (Eddington 1928, p. 104). Such a view is certainly at odds with compar-
ing TD to the (superseded) Newtonian theory when discussing diachronic reduction.
Thermodynamics is not straightforwardly ‘inferior’ to statistical mechanics.
But in the case of SGS I will argue: TD does not apply but SM does. And it is of
foundational significance which theory these successes of thermal physics in this exotic
domain belong to. This is because of the above question of the conceptual priority of
TD and SM, which influences the reduction debate. For instance, one possible—if
not popular—position is that it is a failing of the Boltzmannian entropy that it does
not strictly increase, whereas it is a virtue of the Gibbs coarse-grained entropy that it
does: because this is more faithful to the thermodynamic entropy (cf. Callender 2001).
Thus, not only must we have two distinct theories and a definition of each, but we also
need to be clear on the conceptual priority of one over the other.
Despite these connections and complications surrounding reduction and the sharing,
indeed blurring of concepts, I contend that two core frameworks can be distinguished—
though of course, boundary cases may still remain. In broad terms, this goes as follows.
TD is an abstract theory, that proceeds in ignorance of the constitution of the system,
dealing instead only with macrovariables which obey the Four Laws (or really, Five
Laws—cf. Sect. 4 on the “minus first law”). In contrast, SM describes systems by
considering statistical, or probabilistic, distributional features of the microvariables. In
particular, the state space of equilibrium thermodynamics consists of equilibrium states
labelled by a small number of macrovariables, whereas the state space of statistical
mechanics consists of appropriate probability density distributions over microvari-
ables, such as position and velocity of the microconstituents. In order that we do not
beg the question about reduction, it is important that we keep the concepts of each the-
ory distinct. Accordingly, the concepts of SM, in particular a SM notion of entropy or
equilibrium may turn out to identical to the thermodynamic entropy or equilibrium—
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but this would be a major case of theoretical identification and so should not be assumed
at the outset.
Having admitted the difficulties with dividing thermal physics into SM and TD,
I now offer two reasons why my position—the debate between the Optimists and
Pessimists can be deflated, because TD does not apply although (to an extent) SM
does—might be anticipated/seem natural.
Firstly: as highlighted in the introduction, TD was created in a time when there was
much scepticism about the existence of atoms. Because of this uncertainty surrounding
atoms, TD arose as a theory of empirical generalisations about the bulk properties
of matter, without regard to its microscopic composition. Einstein famously called
thermodynamics a ‘principle theory’, in contrast to those ‘constructive theories’ that
‘build complex phenomena out of relatively simple postulates’ (Einstein 1919, p.
228).7 The generalisations of TD were extrapolated from regularities in phenomena
familiar from tabletop systems of gases, pistons etc. Thus it is unsurprising that these
generalisations do not hold in the radically different realm of stars and galaxies. But the
constructive theory now considered to underpin the generalisations of TD—SM—may
well apply (and this is considered in Sect. 5).
Secondly: my view is already suggested by some of the physics material reviewed
above. The thermal physics of SGS never abstracts away to macroscopic bulk variables
from the microvariables—i.e. the position and momenta of the individual stars—and
probability distributions over these microvariables.8 And indeed, Sect. 2.3’s discus-
sion of the gravothermal catastrophe used statistical mechanical notions of entropy.
Furthermore, the collisionless Boltzmann equation and the Fokker-Planck equation
for SGS originate from non-equilibrium SM...while it is equilibrium SM to which TD
putatively reduces. So the inapplicability of TD should be anticipated.
In the next section, I develop the sketch above, of what I take to be the key features
of thermodynamics, and then argue that the thermal physics used in SGS cannot be
thermodynamics.
4 Thermodynamics “Construed”
I will first present my perspective on thermodynamics in general (Sect. 4.1), and then
argue that thermodynamics so construed, does not apply to SGS (Sect. 4.2).
4.1 Thermodynamics in general
The state space of thermodynamics is the space of equilibrium states, parametrised by
two or more macrovariables. For example, for a gas, the points of the state space can
be labelled by the pressure and volume (p, V ); for a film, they are labelled by surface
7 This distinction, though announced in a ‘mere’ newspaper article has had a great legacy, e.g. in the debate
about the primacy of matter vs. geometry in the philosophy of spacetime, e.g. Brown (2005) and Janssen
(2009).
8 Interestingly, away from the Newtonian gravitation regime, matters may be different: the no-hair theorems
show that a black hole can be characterised by a few bulk variables: its mass, angular momentum and electric
charge.
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tension and area; for a magnet, magnetic field and magnetization; and for a dielectric,
electric field and polarization (e.g. Tong 2012, §4).
Thermodynamic equilibrium states—whatever their relation to SM equilibrium
states and however idealised—are states in which the macrovariables no longer vary
in time: the system (as described by thermodynamics) will sit there indefinitely.9
That systems will reach such an equilibrium state has been dubbed the ‘minus first
law’ of thermodynamics (Brown and Uffink 2001). Once the system has reached an
equilibrium state, its thermodynamic entropy—which is a function of these labelling
macrovariables—cannot increase further under spontaneous processes. There are no
spontaneous trajectories through the thermodynamic state space of equilibrium states:
if a system is in an equilibrium state then by definition it will not change. Instead,
the state of the system will only change when we perform certain interventions on
it, e.g.: inserting a partition, squeezing with a piston, placing the system in thermal
contact with another, or with a heat bath... etc. These interventions implement certain
thermodynamic processes, such as isothermal compression and adiabatic expansion,
by changing external parameters such as volume. For this reason, thermodynamics
has been described as a control theory (Wallace 2014). A number of actions can be
performed on the controlled system and only certain transitions between states can
be induced.10 That thermodynamics can be described as a control theory sets it apart
from other physical dynamical theories which describe the space of possible states
of a system and the system’s spontaneous trajectory through that space, which is
represented by a curve in that space.
In contrast, curves through the equilibrium state space of thermodynamics—
understood as ‘thermodynamic processes’—have been the source of interpretative
controversy. As emphasised by Norton (2016) the term ‘equilibrium process’ is oxy-
moronic: if equilibrium is understood to mean ‘a state in which nothing changes’ then
by definition it contradicts a ‘process’—whose meaning is that something changes;
cf. also Lavis (2017) and Valente (2018).
For this reason, Tatiana Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa called curves in thermodynamic
equilibrium space ‘quasi processes’ to indicate that they were not physical processes
at all (Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa 1925, 1956). Instead the system is ‘nudged’ from equi-
librium (and so out of the equilibrium state space, cf. Norton 2016, p. 45) by altering
one of the control variables/external parameters—e.g. by raising the temperature by
putting the system (at temperature T1) in contact with a heat bath at T1 +T . Accord-
ing to the minus first law of TD, the system will reach a new equilibrium state at this
9 Of course, absolute equilibrium is a fiction: it is not realised exactly by any system in the world. Insofar
as the systems in question are also described by classical mechanics, then—due to the Poincaré recurrence
theorem—we know that given enough time any system will return arbitrarily close to its initial state and
thus not remain indefinitely in a given state. Thus, Feynman is meant to have quipped that ‘equilibrium is
the state the system gets into after the very fast stuff [e.g. transients] is over, but the very slow stuff [e.g.
Poincaré recurrence] has yet to begin’. But the key point is that we get away with treating a system as if
they were in thermodynamic, i.e. absolute, equilibrium, because the ‘very fast stuff’ is over and the ‘very
slow stuff’ does not matter for the phenomena we are interested in.
10 Sometimes thermodynamics is also referred to as a resource theory, or as means-relative, e.g. Horodecki
and Oppenheim (2013).
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new temperature. The process is then iterated with a series of heat baths at different
temperatures, and in this sense the system is pushed along the curve.11
This picture of curves in equilibrium space involving nudging the system and it
returning to (a perhaps new) equilibrium state requires that the system is thermody-
namically stable. In particular, it requires that the second derivative of the entropy
is negative12: ∂2 S
∂E2 < 0. In terms of other variables, an alternative requirement for
stability is that the heat capacity Cv is positive (cf. Landau and Lifshitz 1969, p. 47;
Thompson 1972, p. 72).
This is why positive heat capacity is often taken as a principle of thermodynamics.
Indeed, as I mentioned in Sect. 2.3 (2): strange non-thermodynamic behaviour can
occur with a system with negative heat capacity. For example, if a heat bath B (with
positive heat capacity, C Bv ) has a lower temperature than a system S with negative heat
capacity C Sv , heat flows from S to B raising the temperature of both. If |C Bv | < |C Sv |,
an equilibrium can be reached where both systems are at a higher temperature than
initially.13
To sum up: the state space of thermodynamics consists of equilibrium states labelled
by a small number of macrovariables. In order for a system to undergo any change,
the control variables must be altered by an external system (Lavis 2017). Thus, a
curve through this equilibrium state space does not represent any spontaneous pro-
cess. Instead, a substantive idealisation is in play: and for this to be connected to the
behaviour of real systems the system must be thermodynamically stable so that after
small changes in the control variables the system returns to another equilibrium state.
4.2 Thermodynamics does not apply to SGS
I claim: the theory discussed above is a far cry from the type of thermal physics used in
galactic dynamics, in trying to deal with the ‘gravitational million body problem’. In
this section, I will argue in a two-pronged attack that thermodynamics—as construed
above—does not apply to SGS.
As the state space of TD is the space of possible equilibrium states, we must first
consider: what would count as a thermodynamic equilibrium state for a SGS? It is
unclear. Binney and Tremaine simply deny that they are any (Binney and Tremaine
1987, p. 269). Callender is more flexible, suggesting that some unusual states do the
job. (However, these unusual candidates are statistical mechanical states and so I delay
discussion of them until Sect. 5).
11 Whether this is an approximation in the sense of Norton (2012) (and whether it can be done reversibly
etc.) is beyond the scope of this paper.
12 Here are some details. To check that the system is not unstable with respect to spontaneously becoming
inhomogeneous, (Avoras 2013, §2.10) imagines splitting the system—already in equilibrium—into two
uneven halves (on the left (E + E, V + V , N + N ) and on the right (E − E, V − V , N − N )
and then he asks: will the entropy increase or decrease? Using S = S(E + E, V + V , N + N ) +
S(E − E, V − V , N − N ) − S(E, V , N ), he shows that in order that S = 0, the entropy must be
a concave function of (E, V ) at fixed N .
13 If the converse is true, |C Bv |>|C Sv |, then the heat bath B will not increase its temperature ‘quickly enough’
as energy flows in. That is, the system’s temperature will increase faster than the heat bath’s temperature
and so they will not reach the same temperature.
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The gravothermal catastrophe hints at why: it seems that no equilibrium will be
reached since, according to the gravitational potential, the core can keep contracting
indefinitely becoming infinitely dense.14 At this point we face two options.
Either we maintain that such singularities are unphysical, as discussed in Sect. 2.3.
They hint at the breakdown of the theory, and any attendant approximations we may
have used to deduce the singularity. No such infinities will be reached because other
effects will kick in. In the case of globular clusters, the formation of binary stars
provides an energy source to resist gravitational collapse. The question is then at
which point is the system in equilibrium, which macrovariables are stationary and
over which timescales. And there appears to be no clear answer to this. Thus, “the
claim that self-gravitating systems have no equilibrium, in particular, is the norm rather
than the exception” (Callender 2011, p. 962) and “galaxies are not in thermodynamic
equilibrium” (Binney and Tremaine 1987, p. 571).
The second option is that the collapsed state of infinite density is an equilibrium
state—after all, nothing will happen. But I submit that even if we dub this state a
thermodynamic equilibrium state, it is only one state and to do thermodynamics, we
need a whole state space of different possible equilibrium states so that, for instance, we
can define curves through this space and so discuss adiabatic and isothermal processes
(cf. Sect. 4.1). If we have one lone equilibrium state, then we cannot talk of changing an
external parameter such as volume in order to ‘nudge’ the system to a new equilibrium
state, if there is only one state in the whole state space!
This brings me to the second prong of my attack. Even if we could construct an
equilibrium state space, there is another problem: SGS are unstable. Perturbing (‘pok-
ing’) the systems, even very gently in the manner required for a quasi static process,
can lead to runaway instability. This is unsurprising: even without considering the con-
cavity of entropy (i.e. the condition ∂2 S
∂E2 < 0) and other mathematical conditions (cf.
footnote 12), we know this is exactly what happens in gravitational systems—recall
the ‘gravitational clumping’ in Fig. 4! Not only will the system be inhomogeneous
with respect to the position of the constituents, but the negative heat capacity implies
that an initial temperature gradient is exacerbated. If one system loses energy to the
other its temperature increases, whilst the system gaining energy has a decreasing tem-
perature, perpetuating the heat flow between them indefinitely, as seen in Sect. 2.3’s
gravothermal catastrophe. Initial temperature gradients are accentuated by the heat
flow rather than dissipated. This is characteristic of SGS; small inhomogeneities (in
the distribution of matter as well as temperature) get amplified not dissipated.
This lack of thermal stability means that after the small interventions used in enact-
ing a ‘thermodynamic process’, the system will not return to a new (and nearby)
equilibrium as required in TD, i.e. by the minus first law of TD. Instead, because SGS
do not fulfil the conditions discussed in the previous section (such as positive heat
capacity) for thermal stability, a small perturbation will lead to a large change in the
state of the system.
Finally, as an aside, notice that the perspective of TD as a control theory brings to
light the unthermodynamic nature of SGS. The point here is not merely the obvious,
14
“Doing nothing, whilst perhaps difficult for human beings, is altogether excluded for a self-gravitating
star system” (Heggie and Hut 2003, p. 45).
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albeit amusing, thought that we cannot manipulate a star, let alone a globular cluster or
galaxy. (Cf. the quote from Rowlinson 1993 which I earlier took as emblematic of the
Pessimists.) Whilst Elson says ‘globular clusters provide an ideal laboratory’ (Elson
et al. 1987, p. 565), there are important differences between SGS and ordinary TD
system that influence how we “manipulate” these systems in computer simulations.15
In particular, different parameters (such as temperature, density, size of the system)
cannot vary independently. The volume of the system is determined by the gravitational
potential, and thus volume is not independent of the energy of the system. Hut (1997),
p. 10 describes a SGS as having only ‘a single coupling constant’—the number of stars.
Therefore, even if we could induce the SGS to transition from one state to another,
there is only one control variable. As Hut (1997) vividly describes, in a star cluster
there are no cylinders or pistons. Instead the stars are confined by their collective
gravitational field.
To sum up the argument of this section: I have argued for
The Main Verdict: There is no appropriate equilibrium state space for a SGS.
Furthermore, the instability of SGS means that the minus first law of thermo-
dynamics does not apply, and consequently there can be no ‘thermodynamic
processes’.
5 Does statistical mechanics apply to SGS?
I say Yes. That is, the success of thermal physics in application to SGS—such as the
collisionless Boltzmann equation etc.—should be attributed to statistical mechanics,
not to thermodynamics.
A critic might object that only the mathematical machinery of SM succeeds: stellar
systems contain vast numbers of stars (and we can’t even solve the 3-body prob-
lem!) and thus the calculational problems we faced for a mechanical description of
a gas of 1023 molecules arise again in the context of self-gravitating systems and so
similar mathematical techniques are required. (Indeed, with the good comes the bad:
similarities in mathematical success are also followed by similarities in mathemat-
ical difficulties. For instance, the scope of SM of SGS is limited to collisionless or
weakly interacting systems: some SGS have interactions that are too strong for SM to
handle—just like in the case of terrestrial SM! Cf. Callender 2010, §5).
Accordingly, in this section I discuss the extent to which SM applies. I will agree
with the above critic: the applicability of SM does have limitations: in particular, the
evolution of self-gravitating systems never reaches a SM equilibrium. Nonetheless,
the success of SM is not merely mathematical: when a gravitational kinetic equation
can be given, the entropy cannot decrease. Thus, it is not merely the mathematical
machinery of SM that applies, although the success of SM must be qualified.
15 For an insight into the difficulties—beyond the sheer size of N—with such computational models, see
(Heggie 2003, p. 83).
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5.1 An approach to equilibrium?
Describing quantitatively the approach to equilibrium is a key part of the enterprise
of SM, known as non-equilibrium SM.16 Can we describe the behaviour of stellar
systems as an approach to equilibrium? If so, this would be a fundamentally statistical-
mechanical explanation of the phenomena.
But indeed, there is a problem. Thus Binney and Tremaine say that “we can always
increase the entropy of a self-gravitating system of point masses at fixed total mass
and energy by increasing the system’s degree of central concentration” (Binney and
Tremaine 1987, p. 268). Consequently, no density function f (−→r ,−→v , t) maximises
entropy for finite mass and energy.17 So if SM equilibrium is taken to be defined
as the maximum entropy state (a feature common to both the Gibbsian and Boltz-
mannian definitions of equilibrium) a SM equilibrium cannot be found for finite
systems.
There are three possible reactions. First, Binney and Tremaine conclude that the
behaviour of SGS cannot be treated as a relaxation to equilibrium. f (−→r ,−→v , t) is
not analogous to the velocity distribution of an ideal gas relaxing to the Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution. Galaxies and other typical stellar configurations are not the
result of a long-term thermal equilibrium (Binney and Tremaine 1987, p. 269).
Second, Callender (2011) takes a different view and suggests that the unconven-
tional states such as the collapsing core-halo states and similar Dirac δ-function
‘singular peaks’ should “be regarded as equilibrium states for the same reasons cups
of coffee at room temperature can be” (Callender 2011, p. 968). If these states can be
interpreted as SM equilibrium states, then (on this view) the behaviour of SGS could
be an approach to equilibrium.
However, a cup of coffee is in a local equilibrium state. Rather than being described
by a global Maxwellian distribution such as,
f (p, q) = Ne p
2
2mkT , (7)
the system is in a local Maxwellian distribution. For instance, the temperature of
the coffee varies with position, but locally looks like an equilibrium state. Thus over
certain distance scales, the coffee looks like it is in equilibrium.
f (p, q) = N (q)e p
2
2mkT (q) (8)
Whilst the cores of stars are in local but not global equilibrium, the unconventional
states that Callender proposes are not states of local equilibrium.18 Further, by Cal-
16 Thermodynamics only states that a system will go to equilibrium (a tendency that has been dubbed
the “minus first law” of thermodynamics, as noted in Sect. 4.1). It does not say anything about how fast
equilibration occurs.
17 A density function that maximises entropy exists only for the isothermal sphere which has infinite mass
and energy (Binney and Tremaine 1987, p. 268).
18 Individual stars are an interesting case: are they examples of SGS that admit of a TD description (and so
provide a counterexample to my thesis)? Since they are in local equilibrium, perhaps some of the problems
123
Synthese
lender’s own lights the ‘Dirac peak’ is the wrong state to use; since he claims that
the canonical ensemble (in which the state is defined) is the wrong ensemble to use
for astrophysical systems and instead the microcanonical ensemble should be used
(Callender 2011, p. 967).
Thirdly, you can walk straight in a particular direction without reaching some pre-
scribed destination. That is: when a gravitational kinetic equation is given, the entropy
(as a function of the distribution function) increases but never reaches a maximum.
Were there a maximum entropy state, we might want to call this the SM equilib-
rium state. For SGS there is no such destination, but nonetheless these systems head
in that direction: so I conclude that there is (a weak sense) in which they approach
equilibrium, although they do not reach it.
This meshes nicely with our earlier discussion in Sect. 4.2. There we saw (in the
‘second prong of attack’) that due to the instability of SGS, the minus first law of
TD does not hold: SGS do not spontaneously return to TD equilibrium after small
perturbations. I cannot of course go to into detail here about the exact relations between
SM equilibrium and TD equilibrium. But we expect non-equilibrium SM to in some
way justify or underpin the minus first law of TD. So not reaching SM equilibrium
(and consequently limiting the applicability of SM) fits with my earlier conclusion
that the minus first law does not apply to SGS. Furthermore, as we saw in the ‘first
prong of attack’, SGS do not reach a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. Had SM
equilibrium states been available this may have suggested that there is a way to find a
TD equilibrium state space, since SM equilibrium is meant to (in some sense) ground
TD equilibrium. Thus, the lack of SM equilibrium further supports the conclusion of
Sect. 4.
5.2 Surprise?
Should we think it surprising that statistical mechanics applies here? I say: No. The
application of SM to SGS is not surprising. For very similar assumptions are used
in the descriptions of dilute gases and of the SGS that SM is capable of describing.
First, the collisionless Boltzmann equation assumes that the stars in the system are
intrinsically identical (in particular having the same mass m) and non-interacting—
just as Boltzmann assumed for an ideal gas. Secondly, an assumption similar to the
Boltzmann’s infamous ‘Stosszahlansatz’ is made: the presence of star 1 being found
in a particular area of phase space does not raise or lower the probability of star 2
being found there (Binney and Tremaine 1987).
Footnote 18 continued
I raised in Sect. 4.2 for SGS such as globular clusters (i.e. ‘no equilibrium states’) do not apply. Yet the
equilibrium state in Eq. 8 is a probability distribution over microvariables p and q—which, according to
my classification of Sect. 3, is an example of SM, rather than TD, machinery. What to conclude? I think
it will depend on how one draws the line, i.e. what physics one designates as ‘thermodynamics’. Thus, at
the outset of his classic monograph ‘Thermodynamics of the Stars’, E.A. Milne distinguishes two senses of
thermodynamics: (i) a ‘restricted sense as denoting the study of the equilibrium states of enclosed systems’
and (ii) a ‘general way to denote the study of all those phenomena in which temperature plays a part... the
science of heat transfer’ (Milne 1930, p. 5). A more permissive definition of TD—along the lines of Milne’s
(ii)—may classify this case as TD. But for my account propounded in this paper, individual stars seem to
be a boundary case—and one deserving of further study.
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The application of SM may not be surprising, but it might nonetheless still be
surprising that we seem to have an SM description without a TD description. After
all, the concepts of each theory are frequently assumed to be intertwined: as discussed
in Sect. 3, the two theories are not always cleanly separated. But in the next section I
given an explanation of why no TD behaviour emerges from the SM description.
6 The bottom up explanation
I have concluded that whilst there is (to some extent) a SM description of SGS,
thermodynamic behaviour does not emerge. This conclusion allows a peace to be made
between the Pessimists and the Optimists. The Pessimists were sceptical that theory
concerned with steam engines could be extrapolated so far from its human origins
to such exotic realms. To the extent that they are talking about the applicability of
thermodynamics, they are correct. But the Optimists are correct too—thermal physics
is successful in these exotic gravitational realms—provided that by thermal physics
we mean statistical mechanics.
I finish by sketching an explanation of this state of affairs: SGS can be given a SM
description, but thermodynamic behaviour does not emerge. The explanation of this
fact is that a particular mathematical limit—the thermodynamic limit—does not exist
(Padmanabhan 1990, p. 295). The topic of the thermodynamic limit is a vast one (see
Ruelle 1999 for a classic presentation of both continuous and discrete systems). The
key question is whether there is a mathematically well-defined ideal infinite system
obtained by n → ∞, where n is the number of constituents of a system.19 Usually,
the thermodynamic limit not only takes n → ∞ but also fixes the density, i.e. nV → k,
whilst n → ∞.
The Bottom Up Explanation: Generically, in the thermodynamic limit, ther-
modynamic behaviour emerges from the SM description. But the thermodynamic
limit does not exist for self-gravitating systems.
In filling out this explanation, I will discuss: (1) why the limit does not exist and
(2) the significance of its not existing.
(1) The thermodynamic limit does not exist for self-gravitating systems. To prove
the existence of a thermodynamic limit, it suffices to show that two conditions are met
by the system under consideration (Penrose 1979, p. 1963), see also (Thompson 1972,
ch. 3) and (Ruelle 1999, ch. 3):
1. Tempering the interaction between distant particles must be negligible. Here is
an example of a system satisfying this tempering condition: a pair potential U (x)
(where x is the distance between the two particles) has a finite range if there is a
distance R0 such that U (x) = 0 for |x |  R0.
2. Stability the interaction is stable: if there is a real number B  0 such that the
potential energy of n particles located at x1, ...xn , ∀x∀n U (x1, x2...xn)  −nB.
19 I should note that how such procedures should be understood and classified is the topic of philosophical
debate, e.g. Norton (2012).
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These two conditions are violated by the long-range and short-range nature of the
gravitational potential respectively. 1. Tempering is violated because the gravitational
potential between two distant particles (i.e. stars) is V ∼ 1
r
, which is unlike the
potential above: whilst the potential decreases with distance, U (x) = 0 for any |x |.
As we saw earlier, the interaction between a star and its distant neighbours is not
negligible, but indeed quite the reverse: as seen in Fig. 1, the long-range nature of the
gravitational potential dominates the behaviour of the cluster. Of course what counts
as ‘negligible’ is not categorical20, but for no degree of accuracy does it seem we can
treat these gravitational interactions as ‘negligible’. 2. Stability has two components.
Firstly, the potential energy must be bounded from below; condition 2 states that there
must be a number, −nB, such that the potential energy is always greater than this
number. But, as seen in Fig. 2 the gravitational potential is not bounded from below:
as r → 0, U → −∞. Secondly, Stability requires that U does not grow faster, as a
function of n, than n. This too is violated by the gravitational potential. Hut (1997),
p. 8 calls the gravitational potential ‘superextensive’: U ∼ n 53 .21
Thus, SGS differ from ordinary thermodynamic systems in (at least) two respects:
the thermodynamic limit does not exist and energy is not extensive for SGS.22
(2) What is the significance of the lack of limit?
In full generality, this is a hard question to answer. But here our task is smaller:
to explain why an SM description of SGS is successful, but yet no TD behaviour
emerges. Given how the two theories are seemingly interwoven, how do we have the
applicability of one without the other? The answer is that the thermodynamic limit
connects the two theories, but because the limit does not exist for SGS, we should be
less surprised at the applicability of one without the other.
I shall briefly spell out three examples of the thermodynamic limit connecting SM
and TD. Here the idea is that the differences between the TD description and the SM
description are washed out in this limit:23
(A) The thermodynamic limit is usually used to reveal features of SM functions. For
instance, the canonical and microcanonical ensembles are equivalent in the thermody-
20 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
21 The ‘back of the envelope’ justification Hut gives for this: “Take a large box containing a homogeneous
swarm of stars. Now enlarge the box, keeping the density and temperature of the star distribution constant.
The total mass M of the stars will then scale with the size R of the box as M ∝ R3, and the total kinetic
energy Ekin will simply scale with the mass: Ekin ∝ M . The total potential energy E pot , however, will
grow faster: E pot ∝ M2R ∝ M
5
3
. Unlike intensive thermodynamic variables that stay constant when we
enlarge the system, and unlike extensive variables that grow linearly with the mass of the system, E pot is
a superextensive variable, growing faster than linear” (Hut 1997, p. 8).
22 Interestingly, despite their surface similarities, the gravitational potential and Coulomb potential differ:
the thermodynamic limit has been proven to exist for certain electromagnetic systems (cf. Lieb and Lebowitz
1972; Thompson 1972, p. 71). But this proof requires quantum considerations (roughly, that there is a ground
state so that the energy is bounded from below, so that the stability condition is satisfied). The tempering
condition can also be satisfied by electromagnetic systems. The presence of both positive and negative
charges leads to Deybe shielding (Callender 2011, p. 961): the force due to distant charges is ‘shielded’
so U (x) = 0 for suitably large |x |. But there is no analogous effect for Deybe shielding for gravitational
systems because the gravitational force does not ‘saturate’ (Lévy-Leblond 1969).
23 But of course, there is much more work to be done to understand how the limit connects SM and TD;
here I only give a suggestive sketch.
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namic limit. The significance of this result is sometimes glossed as: the equivalence
of ensembles in the limit shows that the same thermodynamic functions (and so
behaviour) results—no matter which ensemble is used to calculate those functions.
(B) SM descriptions involve probabilities, whereas the TD descriptions are cate-
gorical. But in the thermodynamic limit, the probability of fluctuations away from the
mean value (e.g. the mean energy), tend to zero. Thus, in the limit, the SM description
becomes more akin to the categorical TD description.
(C) Furthermore, only in the thermodynamic limit are certain SM quantities exten-
sive. For instance, the Gibbs free energy is only extensive in this limit. Or, as seen in
Sect. 2.3, H12 = H1 + H2 is only an approximation, even for short-range potentials
present in familiar cases. Yet, the energy of a subsystem is proportional to the volume,
whereas interactions between subsystems are proportional to the boundary’s surface
area—and so scaling means that interactions thus become negligible, provided the
subsystems are big enough. Thus strictly speaking, even for short-range potentials,
entropy and energy are only extensive in the thermodynamic limit.
Because some SM quantities are only truly extensive in the thermodynamic limit,
they are only identical to their TD correlates in this limit. Thus, it is usual to say that
in the thermodynamic limit, the thermodynamic formalism/functions are recovered
from the SM description. For example, Oliver Penrose claims that “the first objective
of the study of the thermodynamic limit is to demonstrate that in this limit, the laws of
thermodynamics apply and to justify our statistical mechanical recipes for calculating
thermodynamic functions...” (Penrose 1979, p. 1957).
But is the thermodynamic limit a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for recov-
ering TD behaviour from a SM description? (Callender 2011, p. 975) suggests it is
neither necessary nor sufficient. I agree that it is not established to be a necessary
condition: there could exist a type of system for which the thermodynamic limit of a
SM description does not exist but TD nonetheless applies.24 Indeed, the role of the
thermodynamic limit is not the blanket prescription that one must prove the existence
of the thermodynamic limit, in order to be licensed to use the laws of thermodynamics.
Instead, we apply the ideas of thermodynamics to a system just when it is useful to
do so. This leaves open the possibility that thermodynamics might useful for a system
for which the limit does not exist.25 But I contend, contra Callender, that SGS do not
give us this counterexample, since—as I hope to have established in Sect. 4.2—TD is
inapplicable to SGS.26
24 Of course, it would be an interesting development if the existence of the thermodynamic limit was a
necessary condition for the applicability of thermodynamics —but this is not something I can establish
here. I also leave the question of whether the thermodynamic limit is a sufficient condition to one side. If
it is a sufficient condition for the applicability of TD, this helps rule which systems fall under the purview
of TD. But it would be less enlightening for ruling systems out—after all, there could exist an alternative
sufficient condition for the applicability of TD. Furthermore, analysing the counterfactual claim that ‘had
the TDL existed, then TD would have applied’ is hard for SGS: for the TD limit to exist, the system would
have been fundamentally different—as I argued in Sect. 2, the form of the gravitational potential dominates
the behaviour of SGS. And it is this potential which fails the tempering and stability conditions.
25 Black holes are a putative example—but much controversy surrounds this claim.
26 Whilst it is conceivable that there is a system for which the thermodynamic limit does not exist and
yet thermodynamics is useful, there are reasons to be confident of the importance of ‘large N’ in what is
after all, a science of the bulk properties of matter. For instance, according to the Boltzmannian perspective
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To sum up: the fact that the thermodynamic limit does not exist for SGS explains
why the applicability of SM and TD come apart for these systems. Leaving aside
SGS, we generically get back TD from SM in the thermodynamic limit. Whether such
a state of affairs counts as a case of inter-theoretic reduction will depend on one’s
account of reduction (cf. Sklar 1995, ch. 9). In the next subsection I briefly highlight
two connections between the debate at hand and the reduction debate. Then I link
the main focus of this paper—the domain of applicability of thermodynamics—to the
reduction debate.
6.1 The connection to reduction
The first connection is as follows: there is a debate about whether the role of the
thermodynamic limit in SM descriptions of phase transitions blocks the reduction of
TD to SM. Briefly, the concern is that a singularity in the free energy can only be
achieved in the infinite limit27 and this infinite idealisation is unrepresentative of real
systems and so some contend that a complete reduction to SM is unavailable. Others
argue that the use of the limit need not block reduction and the relevant ‘singular type’
behaviour is seen ‘on the way’ to the limit (Butterfield 2011). Does the above discussion
reveal that the thermodynamics limit is crucial (in a way problematic for reduction)
even away from the contentious case of phase transitions? Should it be worrisome
that functions such has the Gibbs free energy are only extensive (and thus like their
TD counterparts) in the thermodynamic limit? I think not. Rather than a qualitative
difference that springs out only at the limit—causing water to boil and other phase
transitions to occur—nothing so glamorous happens. Rather, here the situation is one
of ‘mathematical tidiness’, i.e. the interaction Hamiltonian really is = 0, rather than
≈ 0 . Indeed, I contend that if reduction were thwarted by the ‘exactness’ only existing
in the ‘unrepresentative’ limit, then this would set the bar so high for inter-theoretic
reduction that few or no cases would pass it.
The second connection is a more serious worry for reduction raised by Batterman
(2010): he explicates Gibbs’ reticence to talk about thermodynamic identities, who
instead discusses only ‘analogies’. The concern is that the plurality of Gibbsian ensem-
bles leads to a plurality of microphysical correlates for the thermodynamic entropy.28
Which is the correct one? In the thermodynamic limit the ensembles are equivalent
Footnote 26 continued
on SM, systems inevitably approach equilibrium because of the overwhelming vastness of the equilibrium
macrostate compared to the other macrostates. But this requires N to be large—otherwise there will not be
one macrostate dominating the available phase space. Whilst not required for the cogency of their account in
quite the same way, the Gibbsian also depends on the thermodynamic limit/large N. For, as mentioned above,
Gibbsian ensembles are only equivalent in the thermodynamic limit – a fact held as vital by physicists. For
instance, Huang says “From a physical point of view, a microcanonical ensemble must be equivalent to a
canonical ensemble, otherwise we would seriously doubt the utility of either” (Huang 1987, p. 148): cited
in (Callender 2011, p. 977). Thus, whilst the Gibbsian canonical ensemble is applicable to a one-molecule
gas—unlike the Boltzmannian picture—the thermodynamic limit is nonetheless seen as crucial (Thompson
1972).
27 The free energy is F = −kT lnZ where Z is the canonical partition function Z = 	nexp(− EnkT ). In
order for there to be a non analyticity in this function, n → ∞.
28 Of course, one might independently worry about this for the Gibbs and the Boltzmann entropy.
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and so Batterman contends that this worry disappears. Thus, the thermodynamic limit
plays an important role in discussions about reduction here too.
I now connect the question of domain of applicability of thermodynamics to the
reduction debate. Had TD applied to SGS, this could have been used to support the
view that ‘thermodynamics is fundamental’, in the manner of Eddington’s and Planck’s
views (cf. Sect. 3). But instead, this case study arguably adds to the conceptual priority
of SM. That SM applies without the emergence of TD behaviour agrees with the moral
of Wallace (2015); SM is foundationally important not only insofar as it is connected
to TD.
Of course, the more charitable interpretation of the ‘TD is fundamental’ view is that
it is merely stressing the importance of TD: in particular, one might read the Eddington
quotation in Sect. 3 as emphasising the epistemic security of TD. The claim is that
the principle of entropy increase is a principle for which we have vast amounts of
evidence; in part because the domain of applicability of thermodynamics is taken to
include everyday occurrences such as people ageing, buildings crumblings and coffee
cooling. (Such a universal scope is also part of Albert and Loewer’s ‘Mentaculus’
project, cf. Albert 2000; Loewer 2018). But the case of SGS heeds us to be cautious:
the scope of TD is not universal.
7 Conclusion
The detailed empirical success of our descriptions of SGS form a fascinating, often
stunning, part of physics. But it is a success to be credited to the framework of ideas
provided by statistical mechanics, not thermodynamics. Thus, the situation is: there
is a SM description of SGS such as globular clusters and elliptical galaxies, but no
thermodynamic behaviour emerges. The unusual unstable behaviour of SGS, negative
heat capacities and runaway instabilities, is alien to thermodynamics—but this is
unsurprising when we consider the principle theory of thermodynamics as a control
theory whose state space is that of equilibrium states. In contrast, the constructive
theory of SM applies to SGS; we can write down a probability distribution for a given
star to occupy a certain position and have a certain velocity and that entropy associated
to that distribution is non-decreasing. The applicability of SM without the emergence
of TD behaviour has a bottom up explanation: the thermodynamic limit does not exist
for SGS and so this infinite limit provides a key insight into the connection between
SM and TD.
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